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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAL ROBERTS, ) 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
) RESPONDENT 11 S BRIEF 
) 
) Case No. 16 86 9 
DOUGLAS FREELAND. ) 
Defendant ) 
Plaintiff-respondent brought this action to collect on an agreement 
wherein Plaintiff fed Defendant's livestock on A Pound Gain basis. 
The Complaint was filed November 3, 1978. Summons was served 
November 8, 1978, by delivering to one Ed Obert, a friend of Defendant 
who claimed to be living at the residence. Defendant acknowledged re-
ceiving the complaint and summons the day of service or the following 
day and called Plaintiff's counsel to discuss the case. 
Default certificate was entered February 21, 1979 and default 
judgment March 22, 1979. Thereafter, on June 20th, 1979, Defendant 
filed a motion to set aside default judgment on inadvertance and surprise 
which was denied and Defendant appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The district court denied Defendant's Motion to set aside Default 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appelant seeks to have judgment of district court entered by default 
set aside on the grounds : 
a. Of surprise, inadvertance and excusable neglect. 
b. Defendant alleges that a telephone call initiated by defendant to 
,-:'.:2:,:~ :>f service of summons November 7, 1978, 
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when Defendant offered to get the we~Efl tickets from his truck driver, "r~ 
for which he had been obliged to get since April 20, 1978, (date of 
removing cattle)was a waiver or indefinate extention, against default whi! ~~. 
was taken by Plaintiff March 22, 1979, four and a half months later. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff-respondant and Defendant-appelant 
entered into an oral agreement December 1977 when Plaintiff agreed to 
feed 200 head of livestock for Defendant on a weight gain of 33cents 
per pound gain. 
Defendant was to truCk the cattle and \tve:igh them at Intermountain 1 
Farmers Scale at Delta, Utah as a weigh in figure. Defendant claims I 
I 




animals were weighed and delivered back to the Defendant April 21, 1979} 
'1 
there was a requirement for defendant to furL1ishthe December 1977 
weigh tickets which defendant agreed to do as a basis to compensate 
the Plaintiff for the gain, instead he. reported yard weight before 
leaving Defendants yards. 
Bec~use dfcth,e-:weigh-tiG'k-eta· final payment on gain was not made on 
April 20, and after numerous requests, Plaintiff filed an action Novembe 
1978. Service of Sumt'lmns and Complaint were made on November 8, 197~ 
on one Ed Obe r.t at Defendant's home, who said he resided there, and on 
said date, Defendant called Plaintiff's attorney and said he wmld still 
try and obtain the December 1977 weigh tickets. Some brief comment 
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Was made that the amount of gain being charged foy during the period 
was not very substantial gain (a short gain). (Transcript page 23, line 15) 
There was nothing said about negotiating a settlement (Transcript page 23, 
line 15) Plaintiff's Counsel told Defendant if he had a dispute he should 
get legal counsel. (Transcript page 24, line 7.) 
The weigh tickets were discussed with Plaintiff's attorney 
who stated that Plaintiff has not received from the Defendant the weigh 
tickets (Transcript 24, line 23). Plaintiff's attorney told defendant that 
if there was an area of settlement it should be follqwed, but that Defendant 
should get legal counsel. (Transcript page 2 5, line 17) 
The principal question involved relates to the question of the 
Service of Summons. 
The Davis County Sheriff in his return dated the 8th of Nomember 
1978 stated· 
State of Utah 
ss. 
County of Davis 
I hereby certify and return that I received the within and hereunto 
annexed Summons and Complaint on the 3rd day of November, 1978, 
and that I duly served the same upon the within named DeferJ dant Douglas 
K. Freeland by delivering to and leaving with Ed Obert, friend living 
at residence (Emphasis ours as typewritten on printed form). A person 
of suitable age and discretion and residing at the usual place of abode of 
said Defendant in Layton, County of Davis, State of Utah, a true and oo rrect 
-3-
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copy of said summons on the 7th day of November, 1978 together with a 
copy of the Complaint attached thereto. The return shows the further 
compliance by endorsement, etc. 
De_fendant testified having looked at the summons when he received 
it November 7, 1978, and further testified "Well, I went through, and of :~ 
course at that time I was somewhat disturbed, but I had an idea that 
something was going to come up on it because we hadn't been able to com .,; 
. to an agreement. That's when I first became aware of the problem. " 
(Transcipt Page 9, line 5-8). 
"The following day I made a call to Mr. Robert's attorney." (Trans· -
! 
cript page 9, line 15) quoting Transcript 10, line 2) "Well, it came down 
the issue of what the cattle weighed when they were received at Delta. 
Well I had instructed the trucker that trucked the cattle from Skoal Valley 
to weigh the cattle at Delta." ('lianscript page 10, line 2.) 
(Transcript page IO, line 20) 1The conversation was that I would 
get ahold of the trucker, get the weigh tickets, which apparently were 
not picked up by Mr. Hoberts and taken by the trucker, the discussion 
was that I w:> uld get the weigh tickets and get together with Mr. Roberts a 
hi s,attorney and try to get things worked out. No date was set." (Trans· 
script Page 10, line 2 3-2 7. ) 
"I had some difficulty getting ahold of Mr. Warr---Warr is the 
trucker that trucked the cattle. " (Transcript page 12, line 3) "I got 
hold of Mr. Warr a few days after I talked with the attorney Mr. Eliason. 
He couldn't find the weigh tickets." (Transcript page 12, line 10). 
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Judgment right after April 11, 1979. 
On being asked "What did you do upon receiving the Default Judgment?" 
"I immediately called Mr. Eliason (!Oncerning it. " Further 
quoting from Defendant's testimony, "After you had the second conver-
sation with Mr. Eliason, what action did you take?" 
"I did contact you (Defendant's attorney) and ask you to represent 
me." (Transcript page 16, line 26. The Judgment was certified April 
11, 1979. ('Ilanscript page 16, line 1) 
Question· "And when did you contact me.? "(Defendant's attorney) 
(Transcript page 16, line 26). 
Answer· "I would say the first of May." 
Question: "And is it true that I prepared legal documents for 
your signature?" 
Answer: ncorrect." (Transcript page 16, line 25) 
Question: "Did you leave the state after I prepared the document-
ation?" 
Answer: "We were gone for a week--two weeks at a time all 
through the period. " 
Question: "And when did you return from Idaho? When did you 
return to the state?" 
Answer: "Well, we returned many times. I have a man in Idaho and 
I was up there for a week and back here, up there for two weeks and back 
here." 
Question: "And when was the earliest convenience that you signed 
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Answer: "I think I got a letter from your office." (Transcript page 17, 
line 7). 
From November 7, 1978 (date of service) until March 22, 1979, 
Defendant didn't contact anybody, an attorney or anybody else. 
Question: (by Plaintiff's attorney) "Now you received a copy of the Judgm . 
~ ~c 
shortly after April 11, 1978 in the mail, is that correct?" 
Answer: "That's correct." (Transcript page 20, line 20). 
·Question: "And talked with me about it?" 
Answer: "That's correct. " 
Question: "So from approximately the 11th of April until the 20th of 
June you didn't communicate anything to me?" 
Answer: "No, I didn't." (Transcript page 21, line 10) 
Here the Court asked Defendant as follows: "The Court has one 
or two questions: How old are you?" 
Answer: "Thirty-nine." 
Court: "How far did you go in school?" 
Answer: "I graduated from Weber State College." 
Court: "So you have no difficulty reading and writing and you understood 
the contents of the summons?" 
Answer: "That is correct. " 
The Court 
(Transcript page 21, line 20-30-) 
The Court at the conclusion of arguments stated," After hearing 
the proof and testimony, the Court finds no good cause to vacate and 
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set aside the Default Judgment. " (End of statement) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID HA VE JURISDICTION. 
The summons and the complaint which defendant acknowledges 
having received November 8, 1978, bore the sheriff's endorsement and 
the time and place of serving "by leaving with Ed Obert, a friend living 
at residence" and the sheriff's name and official title. 
Even though defendant talked on phone with Plaintiff's attorney the 
day following about the case, he never at any time raised any question on 
the service. Defendarl.tS counsel, June 20, 1979, ~in filing an affid~vit of 
surprise and excusable neglect under rule 60 raises the first question 
about the service, more than 7 months after service and more than 60 
days after receipt of the judgment. 
The sheriff's certificate and affidavit of November 8, 1978, is positive 
and controlling. Defendant on July 18th caused Ed Obert to sign an affidavit 
which alleged that on or about the 16th day of November, 1978, while 
visiting at the residence of defendant, was given the summons. The 
affidavit is substantially in error on the date of service. and other 
circumstances. It is purely hearsay with no opportunity for cross 
examination. 
Rule 4 was fully complied with when Ed Obert in defendant's house 
stated he was a resident there and accepted service. With the endorsement 
"by leaving with Ed Obert, a friend living at residence and" defendant 
accepted the service with the endorsement as contained, talked with Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Plaintiff's attorney about the complaint and summons so served without: 
. 
ever objecting,, for more than seven months, even though he received 
copy of the judgment April 11-,, 1979. 
Contrary to defendant's contention and argument,, the requesite 
formality of the manner of service were not sacrificed requiring the 
service to be supplanted by some other form of notice. Ed Obert was 
residing at the residence and so advised the sheriff and accepted servic( 
as resident and delivered it to defendant the same day without prejudic~ 
'-" :.POINT II NO ORAL PROMISE TO FOREGO DEFAU~T 
The contention of the defendant that there was an oral promise by 
Plaintiff's attorney to forego taking a default is absurd and is not suppo1 
by one word of evidence. Defendant was told if he had a dispute with the 
claims of the Plaintiff he should get legal counsel. (Transcript page 24, 
line 7 and Transcript page 25,, line 19).Defendant said he expected the-a~ 
I 
Defendant had supposedly been looking for weigh tickets since 
Dece,mber 1977,, the date of delivery of the cattle and for him to commen 
to Plaintiff's attorney in a phone call made by the defendant at the time 
of service of summons that he was still looking for the weigh tickets, 
could in no way be inferred that Plaintiff would defer proceedings until 
he had found his long lost weigh tickets. 
Defendant told the court he was a graduate of Weber College and 
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POINT IH 
THERE IS NO SURPR.ISE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT UNDER 
RULE 60. AND SERVICE WAS EFFECTIVE. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff .has reviewed carefully all of the cases 
cited by defendant's counsel in his brief and finds nothing that is in 
point with the fact situation of the instant case; for instance in Zucherman 
vs. McCullay 7-FRD-739, 1970 F 2 1015,tretewas a ruling whe!'e service 
had been made on a janitor;. In the case of Leo vs. Shin-shu 30 FRD. 
56 Judson vs. Judson FRD 366; Smith vs. Kincaid 249 Federal 2nd 
243, where service was made on a landlady; such relationship bear 
no resemblance to the instant case where the person served was in the 
home and affirmed to the sheriff that he resided with the defendant. 
The court has made some observations in the case of Utah Sand 
And Gravel Products, Corp. vs. Tolbert 16 Utah 2nd 407, 402 Pacific 
2nd 703. In that case the action had been filed in the wrong court and 
the jurisdiction of the city court was limited to $1000 and ju:l 5ment was 
demanded in e~cess of $20, 000. 00. Obviously, the court designated 
was without jurisdiction in the action and the summons was obviously invalid 
on its face because it sought recovery in excess of the jurisdiction of 
the court. In the instant case there was nothing defective in the service 
or the return of service. The court in Utah Sand and Gravel Products 
Company vs. Tolbert stated "Liberality in interpretation and application 
of new rules of civil procedure should be indulged where no prejudice 
or disadvantage to anyone results, but where failure to comply with rules 
will result in some substantial prejudice or disadvantage to a party, 
they should be adhered to with fidelity. 
Requisite formalities of summons and manner of service prescribed 
by law are intended to assure to recipient bona fides of court process 
~-~ ~l !----:-'-~~"."'0 0f' t-,L~ .l"1'i."t!ing serious attention thereto, and they cannot 
~u..c:rs;n~~ notice bv letter. telephone or any other such means~' 
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Plaintiff in this action is hurt by defendant's ina_ction and the trial -
court has a responsibility to protect him. Of such was the holding of 
the Supreme Court in the Case of BARBER vs. CALDER 522 P2 700) 
where this court unamiously stated: 
L -• 
"However disctetion is not a one way street. As is sometimes sa ;: 
No pancake can be fried so thin that it does not have ltwo sides, 
Both parties have rights which it is the responsibility of the trial _. 
court to protect. In situations where the exercise of discretion 
is appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the determ 
ation of the trial court , whichever way it goes. This is true bee 
due to his close involv~ment with the parties, the witnesses, and: 
the total circumstances of the case, he is in the best position to 
judge what the interests of justice require in safeguar ding the 
rights and interests of all parties concerned. 11 
- . . 
The ~efendantin the instant case was more derelict and self assumi~ 
than was the defendant in the case of PACER SPORT AND CYCLE Inc, 
MYERS Utah 534 P2 616 where defendant told plaintiff's attorney that he, 
was not liable because he had only signed for purpose of obtaining cred~ 
i 
for his son and that he thought the action had been taken care of and 
therefore took no steps to answer the complaint. This court held· 
"That such was neither sufficient to establish excusable neglect 
to require trial court to set aside default judgment entered again~ 
defendant. " and "None of these claims even approaches excusable 
neglect as required under Rule 60 (b) URCP in order to be 
relieved from a default judgment. " "The trial court has a discreti 
in determining whether or not default judgment should be set asid1 
and we, on appeal , should not reverse its ruling except for 
abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbitrary.. capricious, or no 
based on adequatefindings of fact ·or on the law" 
The instant case has much in common with DOWNEY STATE BANK 
vs. MAJOR BLAKENEY CORPORATION Utah 545 P2 507. 
The defendant in that case ap.pealed, attacking the trial court's 
refusal to grant his motion to set aside fl. deffliJH for~r>lncrnr~nn mortg9.~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Techn logy Act, administered by the Utah Stat  Library. 
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He contends 01) that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff's affidavit was insufficient to justify an order to publish 
summons; that no diligent inquiry was made; (2) that the summons 
as published was defective and (3) that the motion should have been 
granted on equitable grounds. In this case the number assigned the 
action was 4473A, but the summons as published contained the mumber 
without the A" The Court in upholding the ruling said~ 
"No one will gainsay that accuracy is always to be desired. 
But there should be no penalty or adverse effect for mere 
error which causes no: harm. 11 "It does not appear that the 
defendant was in any way mislead or adversely affect:ed by 
this variance in the number. 11 
The further issue of the case was that the defendant contended 
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside 
the default judgment, the Supreme Court answered: 
"A primary difficulty he confronts is that as a general proposition, 
one who seeks to vacate a default judgment must proffer some 
defense of a least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify 
a trial of the issue thus raised. As the trial court appropriately 
remarked on this point: the defendant failed to proffer any 
meritorious defense, or in fact any defense at all." 
Also in the instant case there was no defense proffered by the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The court in the instant case had jurisdiction, found no surprise or 
excusable neglect, used wisely its discretion in ordering that the 
inaction for approximately 7 months after service upon defendant 
was prejudicial to the plaintiff if defendant were to be relieved of all 
11 
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